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We investigate whether the origin of an employee provides different motives for wage
discrimination in gift-exchange experiments with students and migrant workers in China.
In a lab and an internet experiment, subjects in the role of employers can condition their
wages on the employees' home provinces. The resulting systematic differences in wages
can be linked to natural groups and economic characteristics of the provinces. In-group
favoritism increases wages for employees who share the same origin as the employer,
while an increased probability of being matched with an employee with a different eth-
nicity reduces wages. Furthermore, wages in the laboratory increase with the actual wage
level in the employees' home province. Nevertheless, employees' effort is not inﬂuenced
by these variables; only the wage paid in the experiment inﬂuences effort.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This paper explores whether the origin of an employee provides different motives for wage discrimination. To this end,
we conduct two stylized gift-exchange experiments with students and migrant workers in the PR China. Students in the role
of employers can condition wages on the employees' origin, while students and migrant workers in the role of employees
choose effort levels based on wages. We augment the collected datasets with complementary data on the characteristics of
Chinese provinces. This combination of lab and ﬁeld data demonstrates three separate, but simultaneously present, effects
on wages levels: First, wages in the experiments are inﬂuenced by actual wage levels in employees' home provinces, second,
in-group favoritism increases wages for employees with the same origin as the employer, and third, ethnic diversity in the
employees' home provinces decreases wages.
Previous research has shown that discriminating behavior can be conditioned on such diverse characteristics as gender (e.g.,
Neumark et al., 1996; Kuhn and Shen, 2013), race (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2007; Pager et al. 2009; Zussman, 2013), age
(e.g., Büsch et al., 2009; Riach and Judith, 2010), and even beauty (e.g., Mobius and Rosenblat, 2006; Wilson and Eckel, 2006).y, Department of Economics, 113 Collegiate Loop, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180, United States.
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crimination can be taste-based (Becker, 1957), differential treatment in labor markets can also be based on economic rea-
soning and differences in the actual or expected productivity of workers (Phelps, 1972). Employers might even offer dis-
criminating payment schemes for identical work to provide proper incentives within teams (Winter, 2004; Goerg et al.,
2010). Furthermore, varying perceptions of fair-wages among otherwise identical workers can result in wage differences.
Two workers with different reference groups will consider different wage levels as fair when the perception of what
constitutes a fair wage depends on the wages paid to the workers in these reference groups (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). A
similar argument can be put forward based on efﬁciency wages: if workers from one group have worse outside options than
the others they are willing to accept lower wages for the same work or the same wage for more work hours. Kuhn and Shen
(2014) propose that this as an explanation why employers in the PR China prefer migrant workers over comparable local
workers as they expect higher levels of work hours for the same wage.
A different kind of motivation for discrimination has been identiﬁed in the social psychology literature. Broad evidence
shows that group identity may lead to the preferential treatment of in-group members and discrimination against out-
group individuals – not necessarily through hostility, but through indifference (Sherif et al. 1961; Tajfel and Turner, 1979;
Halevy et al., 2008). In economics, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) introduced social identity as an important driver of economic
behavior and proposed a utility function according to which individuals aim to behave appropriately given the social group
to which they belong.1 As the group afﬁliation deﬁnes part of one's identity it also inﬂuences the behavior towards group
members and the outside. Thus, identity can provide the microfoundation for the previously discussed taste-based dis-
crimination (see Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, p. 732).
The importance of group afﬁliation has been demonstrated for naturally occurring groups deﬁned by such diverse
features as race (Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001; Chen et al., 2014), gender (Charness and Rustichini, 2011), army platoons
(Goette et al., 2006) and city districts (Falk and Zehnder, 2013). Furthermore, even artiﬁcial groups generated with the
minimal-group paradigm (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) lead to in-group favoritism with potentially increased cooperation in
social dilemmas (Yamagishi and Kiyonari, 2000; Eckel and Grossman, 2005; Chen and Li, 2009) and more efﬁcient coor-
dination in the minimum effort game (Chen and Chen, 2011).
This paper contributions to the literature on natural identities and discrimination by demonstrating that the previously
discussed motives for discrimination are not mutual exclusive. Instead they can be present at the same time and be based on
the same piece of information. In our paper, employers only know the employees' origin resulting in wage discrimination
motivated by different characteristics of the home provinces. First, we observe in-group favoritism in the form of higher
wages for employees with the same origin. Second, discrimination is also based on the ethnical composition in the
employees' home province and employers tend to choose lower wages for workers from provinces with larger shares of
ethnic minorities. Third, we show that, in addition, wages in our experiments are positively correlated with average wages
paid in the home provinces. Furthermore, these different characteristics inﬂuence wages independent of each other. Thus,
our paper is one of few experimental papers which successfully demonstrate the occurrence of discrimination based on
multiple but simultaneously present motives. One notably exception is the work by Falk and Zehnder (2013). In their city
wide trust game, ﬁrst movers condition their trust on the residential districts of second movers in the city of Zürich. The
exhibited trust levels differed systematically between the districts of Zürich – higher socio-economic status led to more
trust and, for subjects from the same district, in-group favoritism in terms of higher trust was observed. In our experiments,
we apply a similar methodology in the context of a stylized employer–employee relationship, however decisions are not
conditioned on districts of a city, but on provinces of a whole country.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss the experimental design. This includes the
description of the modiﬁed gift-exchange game, the implementation of the experiments with students and migrant workers
as subjects, and the complementary data on the characteristics of the Chinese provinces. Section 3 presents behavioral
hypotheses, Section 4 reports our results on the determinants of employers' wage discrimination and employees' effort
provision. Finally, Section 5 discusses the implications of our results and concludes the paper.2. Experimental design
We investigate how employers discriminate employees in two gift-exchange experiments in which wages are condi-
tioned on the employees' home provinces. Using additional ﬁeld data, we identify particular characteristics of the provinces
on which these wages are based on.
The ﬁrst experiment is a laboratory experiment conducted at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (PR China) with students
deciding in the role of employers and migrant workers in the role of employees.2 The second experiment is an internet experiment
at the University of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China) with students deciding in both roles – as employers and employees. The second1 It is worth mentioning that the implications of social identity go beyond discrimination. It applies to most situations in which people behave as they
think they should. Thus, social identity provides insights into topics such as the division of labor in households, education, monitoring at the workplace
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2002, 2008), as well as, discounting and risk preferences (Benjamin et al., 2010).
2 In our paper we refer to workers who migrated to Shanghai from other provinces as migrant workers. In the labor literature on China the term
migrant worker usually refers to workers migrating from rural areas to urban areas even if they move within a province.
Table 1
Details on subjects and elicitation methods in the experiments.
Experiment I Experiment II
Students–migrant workers Students–students
Subjects
# Employer 98 Students 380 Students
# Employee 98 Migrant workers 380 Students
Location Shanghai, PR China Ningbo, PR China
Elicitation method
Wage Strategy method Strategy method
Effort Direct response Strategy method
Employers used the strategy method to choose wages conditional on the 27 possible home provinces/regions of the employees. Migrant workers choose
their effort with the direct response method given their actual wage. Students in the role of employees used the strategy method choosing their effort
conditional on the 10 possible wages.
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similar socio-economic background. Table 6 in the Appendix gives the origins of all subjects participating in both experiments. In
the following, we will ﬁrst describe our simpliﬁed gift-exchange game and the implementation of the experiments. Afterwards, we
describe the complementary ﬁeld data on the characteristics of the employees' origins.
2.1. The game
Similar to Fehr et al. (1998), we model the employer–employee relationship as a bilateral gift exchange. In the bilateral gift-
exchange game one subject decides in the role of an employer and a second subject in the role of an employee. The employer
moves ﬁrst by offering the worker a wage, 11rwr20. The worker then selects an effort level, e, which can either be normal
(e¼0) or high (e¼1).3 Working hard induces a higher effort cost (c¼10), while working normal induces lower effort cost (c¼5).
The payoffs of the employer were framed such that normal effort increases the employers proﬁt by 5, while high effort increases
the employer's proﬁt by a total of 20. Thus, according to this framing employers' payoff (in RMB) is given as:
πEmployer ¼ 20þ 5þ15eð Þ w; with 11rwr20; and eA 0;1f g
and employees' payoff (in RMB) is given as:
πEmployee ¼w
10 if working hard; e¼ 1;
5 if working normal; e¼ 0:
(
To investigate how employers discriminate and base wages on the origin of the employee, wages were set conditional on
the origin of the employee. Thus, using the strategy method (Selten, 1967), employers choose for 27 provinces and regions in
the PR China wages they would assign to employees from these provinces.4 Using the strategy method forces subjects to
think about each of the provinces, making the possibility of discrimination very salient and thereby potentially resulting in
demand effects (Zizzo, 2010). However, it is unclear whether this decreases or increases the likelihood of discrimination.5
Furthermore, even if it increases the likelihood of discrimination it is unlikely to inﬂuence the observed discrimination
pattern instead of just making it easier to detect. We ultimately decided to use the strategy method as it provides an easy
way to obtain sufﬁciently large numbers of observations.
After wages were set employers and employees were randomly matched. Thereafter, the employee decided to either
work hard or normal given the wages, but without any further information on the employer's characteristics.
2.2. Implementation
The ﬁrst experiment was conducted at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University (PR China) and the second one at the University
of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China). Both experiments were organized and run by local research assistants, who were not3 Other studies applying the gift exchange game usually implement the effort as a continuous decisions with convex effort costs (e.g., Fehr et al., 1997,
1998; Brown et al., 2004; Maximiano et al., 2007). We reduce the effort to a binary decision to ensure that the migrant workers understand the game and
the consequences of their decisions. As Zhao (2003) reports 91% of migrant workers in 1999 had no more than nine years of schooling and 17% no more
than six years. Furthermore, we implemented a positive minimum wage to avoid a show-up fee and give all payoffs in the actual currency RMB instead of
an experimental currency with a conversion rate.
4 The list of provinces and regions includes all provinces and autonomous regions. We excluded cities that have the same rank as provinces. The
excluded direct-controlled municipalities are Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin. Fig. 5 in the Appendix shows a map of the PR China with the used
provinces and regions. In this paper we use provinces synonymously for provinces and autonomous regions.
5 In this context it is worth noting that Experiment I was conducted directly after an employment law became effective which bans discrimination
based on ethnic background, race, gender, and religious belief (The Law of the People's Republic of China on Promotion of Employment).
Fig. 1. Different characteristics of provinces/regions.
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subjects.
In our ﬁrst experiment students in the role of employers were paired with migrant workers in the role of employees.
Students were recruited with postings on bulletin boards and the usual recruiting system of the Vernon-Smith-Lab of the
Shanghai Jiao-Tong University. Migrant workers were recruited among construction workers and cleaning staff.6 Partici-
pating students were scheduled to arrive 10 min prior to the migrant workers' arrival and seated in cubicles. Upon arrival,
migrant workers were led into a room next to the laboratory.7
In both rooms the instructions were distributed and read aloud. After the assistants had asked control questions the
experiment started. In the employer room, students chose the wages based on the worker's origin using the strategy
method. In the meantime each migrant worker had to report her/his home province before being anonymously and ran-
domly matched to one employer. Then, the migrant worker was informed about the wage the employer had assigned to her/
him. However, the worker was neither informed about the possibility that employers could assign different wages to
provinces, nor the province the employer was coming from.8
Thereafter, a questionnaire was distributed. Among demographics, we elicited employers' self-reported general trust
towards the people of the 27 provinces/regions.9 Meanwhile, ﬁnal payoffs were calculated and afterwards paid to the
participants. The whole experiment was conducted using pen and paper and lasted roughly one hour.
Our second experiment was conducted as an internet experiment at the University of Nottingham Ningbo (PR China). The setup
was almost identical to the ﬁrst experiment. However, this time students decided in the roles of employers and employees. First, all
subjects decided in the roles of employers, then they were informed that they would also decide in the roles of employees. Subjects
did not receive feedback before completing their decisions as employees. Furthermore, employees' decisions were elicited using the
strategy method, i.e., every employee had to choose an effort level for each possible wage.2.3. Complimentary ﬁeld data
With the data gathered in the experiments we are able to identify wage discrimination, i.e., whether employees from
different provinces receive different wages. Yet, to identify potential motives driving this discrimination we complement our6 See Appendix A for details on recruiting and instructions.
7 The doors of the laboratory were open and students were made aware of the bypassing workers. The purpose of this procedure was to ensure that
both students and migrant workers could see each other. Thereby, students were afﬁrmed that they would interact with real migrant workers and the
migrant workers were made aware that wages were actually chosen by students.
8 Again, to keep the setup as simple as possible for the migrant workers they were only asked to choose their effort levels for the actual wage, i.e., no
strategy method for the effort decision.
9 We asked employers for each province and region: Do you trust people from this province? The answer was given on a scale from 0 (not trusting at all)
to 10 (trusting very much).
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were taken from two different datasets.
The 2007 Statistical Yearbook of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics10 provides us with economic characteristics for
the provinces, including average annual wages, the percentage of rural population, and the gross regional product in
comparison to the gross domestic product.11 Average hourly wages were not publicly available, however, in 1995 China
adopted a 40-h week for the whole country and thus the annual average wages provide a proxy for the hourly wages.12
To capture ethnical differences between provinces we gathered the percentage of the Non-Han population from the 2010
Province Population Census Dataset.13 The largest ethnicity is the group of Han Chinese who represent 90% of the popu-
lation in China. However, 55 other ethnic groups are ofﬁcially recognized by the government of the PR China and in most
provinces these ethnic groups are minorities.14 Instead of distinguishing further between the smaller ethnic groups we focus
on the total fraction of people in a province who are not Han Chinese.
Fig. 1 gives histograms for the added variables and demonstrates for most of them a substantial heterogeneity.3. Hypotheses
In the following we derive our hypotheses based on the existing literature. As discussed in the introduction of this paper
previous research has identiﬁed different motives for discrimination – in this study, we will focus on three of these motives:
economic characteristics, in-group afﬁliations, and ethnic diversity. In Appendix E we present a model which formally
incorporates these potential inﬂuences. Other forms of discrimination that are based on individuals' characteristics (e.g., age,
gender) are not viable in our setting as employers do not have the necessary information.
In our setting employers have to decide on wages with the hope that employers will respond in-kind and exert high
effort. According to the fair-wage hypotheses (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) an employee will respond kindly to
wages above the employee's perceived fair wage and withdraw effort when wages fall short of this benchmark. This fair
wage depends on the comparisons with a reference group and, consequently, it will depend on the wages paid at the
location of the experiment. In addition, the wage levels of the home provinces might inﬂuence the benchmark.15 Migrant
workers only move to a location if it results in higher income and, thus, every newly offered wage must justify the migration
to the new location. If the reference wage were only inﬂuenced by the wage level at the location of the experiment it should
not lead to differential treatments of employees based on their origin. However, if in addition the evaluation were at least
partly inﬂuenced by the wages in the employees' home provinces employers would have to take this into account paying
more to employees from provinces with higher wages.
Hypothesis 1. Wages in the experiment increase with average wage levels in the provinces.
Our next two hypotheses are aiming at in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination as driving forces for wage dis-
crimination. When employers decide on the wages, they know if they have the same home province as the employee.16 Thus, the
origins of the employees generate natural in-groups (employees with the same origin as the employer) and out-groups (employees
with different origin as the employer). The broad literature on in-group favoritism has demonstrated that subjects tend to treat in-
group members more favorably. Furthermore, Falk and Zehnder (2013) demonstrated that subjects trust strangers from the same
city district more than subjects from other districts. Along these lines, we expect employers to exhibit in-group favoritism:
Hypothesis 2. Employers assign higher wages to employees from the same home province.
Another attribute that deﬁnes in-groups is the ethnicity of employer and employee. Similar to Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001), Fershtman et al. (2005), and Chen et al. (2014) we expect subjects to favor those with the same ethnic background.
In our experiments, all employers were Han-Chinese and we expect them to favor employees who are Han-Chinese, too.
However, in our experiment employers are not able to observe the ethnicity of an employee. Consequently, we expect a
more gradual type of discrimination based on the percentage of Non-Han population in the home province of the employee.10 We use the 2007 data as it was publicly available when the ﬁrst experiments were conducted.
11 In addition, we obtained the population size and the number of unemployed. Since both variables were not directly correlated with the wage in the
experiment, we do not report them here. For more details refer to the Appendix.
12 With 52.14 weeks per year this results in hourly wages between 7.48 RMB and 15.11 RMB. The average earnings of employees in our experiment are
in this region; migrant workers earn on average 7.78 RMB and students 8.81 RMB. The range of possible wages was between 11 and 20 RMB resulting in
possible earnings for the employees between 1 RMB and 15 RMB.
13 China Data Center, University of Michigan.
14 Only in Tibet and Xinjiang do Han Chinese not account for the majority of the population.
15 On average, migrant workers send 50–55% of their income as remittances to their families at home (Du et al., 2005). The families at home, i.e., mostly
workers' parents and workers' children, have to buy goods and services with these remittances and so the conditions in the provinces are still important
when evaluating wages. Another simple reason why wages might be partly evaluated on the basis of the home wages could be inertia. As people move to
the new location they might need time to get accustomed to the local wage level.
16 In China the home province is inherited from the parents and, based on the Hukou system, the only place for which individuals have the legal right
to permanently reside. Only in the home province do individuals enjoy citizens' rights such as welfare beneﬁts and school access for their kids. The home
province is rather ﬁxed and very hard to change.
Fig. 2. Distribution of wages in the two experiments.
Fig. 3. Median wages per province, ordered by median wages.
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ferent ethnicity, i.e., an out-group member.17
Hypothesis 3. Assigned wages decline with increasing shares of Non-Han Chinese in the employees' home province.
In the following we discuss the expected behavior of the employees. Employees in our experiment did not receive
information on the origin of the employer. Therefore, in-group favoritism is an unlikely inﬂuence on the effort decision.
Nevertheless, we have two predictions based on the fair wage hypotheses. The ﬁrst one is in line with the general ﬁndings in
the laboratory gift-exchange literature demonstrating a positive effort response to increasing wages (for recent reviews, see
Charness and Kuhn, 2011; Cooper and Kagel, 2016).
Hypothesis 4. Increasing wages lead to increasing effort regardless of the origin of the employees.
And ﬁnally, given a ﬁxed wage we would expect different effort levels among provinces if the reasoning behind hypotheses 1 is
correct and employees evaluate the appropriateness of wages based on the average wages paid in their home province.
Hypothesis 5. Given the same wage in the experiment employees from provinces with higher average wages should exert
less effort.17 Similar to this argument is the observation by Grimm and Mengel (2009) that in viscous populations with endogenous groups individuals are more
likely to interact with similar types/individuals. In the investigated prisoner's dilemma, this selection ultimately increases cooperation.
Table 2
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Students–migrant workers Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Wage Origin 0.400nnn 0.338nnn 0.175nn 1.635nnn 1.244nnn 0.665nnn
(0.0623) (0.0715) (0.0718) (0.273) (0.243) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.502nn 0.437nn 0.382n 1.373nnn 1.223nnn 1.266nnn
(0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.193) (0.161) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin 1.231nnn 1.050nnn 0.641nnn 3.749nnn 2.784nnn 1.416nnn
(0.121) (0.168) (0.187) (0.497) (0.509) (0.381)
% Rural Origin 0.498 0.0419 3.306nnn 3.383nnn
(0.353) (0.433) (1.033) (1.110)
Trust in Origin 0.0493nn 0.0476nn 0.101nnn 0.116nnn
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0193)
Constant 13.40nnn 13.49nnn 13.52nnn 11.65nnn 13.60nnn 14.62nnn
(0.114) (0.323) (0.351) (0.492) (0.915) (0.791)
Additional Controls No No Yes No No Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2646 2646 2646 10,260 10,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 98 380 380 380
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:0001 po0:0001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed effects and
robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional covariates are the gross regional product relative to the gross domestic product and
region dummies (Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and Northeast China). Table 8 in the Appendix reports all coefﬁcients.
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
n po0:1.
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4.1. Employers' behavior
Fig. 2 gives the distribution of wages in the two experiments. Mean wages between the two experiments differ only
slightly, with migrant workers receiving lower wages as employees (13.98) compared to students (14.24, p¼0.23 two-sided
Fisher–Pitman permutation test for independent samples, FPI).18 However, the ﬁgure reveals that the two distributions look
quite differently (po0:001, Epps–Singleton Empirical Characteristic Function test).19 Migrant workers in the role of
employees receive signiﬁcantly more often the lowest possible wage of 11 (po0:001, FPI), but also signiﬁcantly more often
the maximum wage of 20 (po0:01, FPI).
We now turn our attention to the question whether different wages are assigned to employees from different provinces.
Fig. 3 gives the mean wages per province assigned to migrant workers in Experiment I (left) and students in Experiment II
(right). The wages are ranked from the lowest to the highest and while the order in both experiments is not exactly the
same, assigned mean wages for the provinces are highly correlated between the two experiments (r¼0.8708 with
po0:001). The ﬁgure clearly demonstrates heterogeneity in the assigned wages and 140/301 out of the 338 possible
pairwise comparisons of wages between two provinces are signiﬁcant in our experiment with migrant workers/students as
employees (all po0:05, two-sided Fisher–Pitman permutation test for paired replicates, FPP).20 Although the ﬁgure reveals
that on average different wages are assigned to the provinces some employers are insensitive to the employees' origin. In
fact, 44% of the employers matched with migrant workers assign the same wage to all employees regardless of their origin,
while only 3% do so when matched with students. However, 55% of those who do not discriminate in Experiment I assign
the lowest wage to all migrant workers and 33% do so in Experiment II. Fig. 5 in the Appendix presents the distribution of
wages assigned by employers who do not discriminate.
We now test whether certain province characteristics explain the ranking of wages given in Fig. 3. We ﬁrst investigate
each hypothesis separately with non-parametric tests. Thereafter, we run a series of regression analyses to conﬁrm that the
described results are indeed due to separate effects which remain signiﬁcant when controlling for them simultaneously.18 The Fisher–Pitman permutation tests are more powerful alternatives to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney rank-sum
test. For more details refer to Kaiser (2009).
19 The Epps–Singleton Empirical Characteristic Function test is an alternative to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test and usually has a greater power. In
contrast to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test it can be applied to discrete data. For more details refer to Goerg and Kaiser (2009).
20 Obviously, these comparisons are problematic with regard to multiple testing. However, after applying the very conservative Bonferroni correction
21 (students–migrant worker) and 261 (students–students) pairwise comparison remain signiﬁcant on the 5% level in both experiments.
Fig. 4. Average effort per wage in the two experiments.
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vinces in which the second, third and fourth highest wages are paid in the real economy (Zhejiang 27,820 RMB; Guangdong
26,186 RMB; Jiangsu 23,782 RMB) are in both experiments among the provinces that receive the highest median wages
ðZ15 RMBÞ. In both experiments, employers assign signiﬁcantly lower wages to workers from provinces with real life wages
below the median – no matter whether these workers were migrant workers (p¼0.055, FPP) or students (po0:001).
Result 1. Employees assign higher wages to provinces with higher average wages in the ﬁeld. This occurs in both experiments.
In Experiment I, the largest number of employers is originally from the province Jiangsu. In Experiment II, most
employers originated from Zhejiang.21 In both of the experiments these two provinces are among the ones with the highest
assigned median wages. Comparing the wages employers assigned to employees from their home provinces with the mean
wages assigned to the other provinces clearly reveals signs of in-group favoritism with higher mean wages for the home
province. When matched with migrant workers from the home provinces wages are on average 6% higher than for the other
provinces (po0:001, FPP). This effect is even more pronounced when employers are matched with students as the home
provinces of the employers receive on average 19% higher wages (po0:001, FPP).
Result 2. Employers exhibit signs of in-group bias by assigning higher wages to their home provinces.
Given the relationship between actual wages and wages in the experiment, Tibet is clearly an exception. According to the
ﬁeld data on provinces, workers in Tibet receive the highest average wages (31,518 RMB), but in both of our experiments
assigned median wages were very low (12 RMB). However, Tibet is among the three provinces with the highest percentages
of Non-Han Chinese (Tibet 92%; Xinjiang 60%; Qinghai 47%) and all three provinces received the lowest median wage
(12 RMB). Overall, in both experiments employers assigned signiﬁcantly lower wages to provinces with above median
populations of minorities (both experiments po0:001, FPP).
Result 3. Employees assign lower wages to provinces with higher shares of minorities.
Our previously presented results could be due to the fact that province characteristics are correlated with each other.
Table 7 in the Appendix presents these correlations. To control simultaneously for all three discussed motive for dis-
crimination we conduct a series of regressions with employer ﬁxed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at the
province level. Models 1–3 in Table 2 give the estimates for Experiment I and Models 4–6 for Experiment II.
In Models 1 and 4 the coefﬁcients for Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and % NonHan Origin are all signiﬁcant at the
same time conﬁrming that they are indeed distinct motives for discrimination. We observe the same pattern in both
Experiments, but the absolute size of the coefﬁcients for employers matched with students is signiﬁcantly larger compared
to the ones for employers matched with migrant workers. Table 9 in the Appendix demonstrates that the differences in
magnitudes between the two experiments are statistically signiﬁcant.
The reported results on discrimination in Table 2 are on the aggregate level, but a closer look at the individual level reveals that
roughly 93% of the discriminating employers base their decision on at least one of the three motives with substantial fractions of
employers being inﬂuenced by several motives at the same time.22 In Experiment I, 29% of employers discriminate based on
AverageWage Origin, Same Origin, and % NonHan Origin at the same time, while 35% discriminate based on two of the three motives.
In Experiment II, 23% of employers are inﬂuenced by three motives and 49% on two motives at the same time.21 In Experiment I employers from Henan have the highest probability to be matched with an employee from the same province (45%), in Experiment II
it is employers from Zhejiang (63%). The average probability of being matched with an employer from the same province is 5.6% in Experiment I and 41% in
Experiment II. See Table 6 in the Appendix for the origins of the subjects.
22 To classify the discrimination, we individually regress for each employer wp ¼ y0þy1c1pþy2c2pþy3c3pþϵp , with wp being the assigned wage to a province
and c1p ; c2p and c3p being the motives Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and % NonHan Origin. If an estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant on the 10% level we classify
this employer as someone who discriminates based on this motive. Table 10 in the Appendix reports the results of this classiﬁcation approach.
Table 3
Explaining high effort.
Prob(High Effort) Students–migrant workers Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage in experiment 0.2444nnn 1.0343nnn
(0.080) (0.038)
Worker's Origin Real Wage 1.0678 1.2493 0.0565 0.1559
(1.652) (1.738) (0.163) (0.413)
Worker's Origin % NonHan 4.4436 5.3597 1.1770 2.9427
(6.660) (8.688) (0.822) (2.082)
Worker's Origin % rural 3.8897 6.2452 1.5996 4.0650
(7.110) (7.632) (1.021) (2.582)
Worker Female 0.5333 0.7870 0.1028 0.2532
(0.630) (0.685) (0.114) (0.289)
Worker's Age 0.0305 0.0437n 0.0014 0.0038
(0.022) (0.024) (0.005) (0.014)
Constant 5.9813 11.6432 0.5791 14.5151nnn
(7.437) (8.140) (0.835) (2.178)
Observations 98 98 3800 3800
Subjects 98 98 380 380
Prob4χ2 0.510 0.0228 0.432 po0:001
Table reports logit regressions explaining the probability of high effort. Estimates for Experiment II are based on random-effects logistic regression.
nn po0.05.
nnn po0:01:
n po0:1:
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social stigma and discrimination (Wang et al., 2010). The large rural-urban divide in China results in discrimination towards
rural migrants (Meng and Zhang, 2001) as the hukou system reduces urban job opportunities, thereby lowering the bar-
gaining power and ultimately pushing the wages below the workers marginal products (Dollar and Jones, 2013). Thus, our
previously reported results could be indications for discrimination based on the rural background of the employees and we
control for this possible confound. In line with the previous literature, we observe lower wages for employees from more
rural provinces in Experiment II.23 Yet, the inﬂuence of ruralness is a separate effect from Average Wage Origin, Same Origin,
and % NonHan Origin; their coefﬁcients remain signiﬁcant in both experiments.
In addition, we control in Models 2 and 5 for the trust towards the provinces. In both experiments, employers' self-
reported trust towards people with the same home province is more than 25% higher compared to those from other
provinces.24 Yet, the positive impact of trust on wages exceeds a mere in-group favoritism effect as the coefﬁcients for both
Trust in Origin and Same Origin in Table 2 remain positive and signiﬁcant.
After adding further controls for gross regional product and regions in Models 3 and 6, results remain qualitatively the
same. In the Appendix we report additional robustness checks and demonstrate that our results are not inﬂuenced by the
mere ranking of wage levels, the number of unemployed, the population size, or the fact that not all decisions of the strategy
method are equally likely to be payoff relevant. Thus, we can conﬁrm hypotheses 1, 2, and 3.
Result 4. In Experiment II lower wages are assigned to provinces with larger fractions of rural population. In both of our
experiments employers tend to assign higher wages to employees from provinces they perceive as more trustworthy. All previously
reported results remain robust to additional controls.
4.2. Employees' behavior
We now turn to the behavior of the second movers and analyze whether the variables on which wages are conditioned
actually inﬂuence the effort decisions of the employees. Fig. 4 gives the average effort decision for each possible wage. Recall
that the effort decisions in Experiment I were based on the actual wage levels, while in Experiment II they were elicited with
the strategy method. Thus, the number of effort responses per wage varies a lot in the graph on the left, but are constantly
380 in the graph on the right.2523 One potential reason why ruralness does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence assigned wages in Experiment I could be the origin of migrant workers in
Shanghai. The Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Statistics reported in 2011 that 79.4% of the interprovincial migrants were coming from rural occupations.
Thus, employers in Experiment I might have considered all employees as rural resulting in no variation along this variable. This would also explain the large
fraction of employees receiving the lowest possible wage.
24 Based on ﬁxed effects regressions explaining trust with a dummy for the same province. The coefﬁcient is in both experiments highly signiﬁcant.
25 The strategy method allows a cleaner analysis of employees' decisions as we observe counterfactuals for every possible wage. One could argue that
in our ﬁrst experiment potential inﬂuences on the effort are already taken into account by the wage setting employer and thus we would not be able to
T. Chmura et al. / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 178–200 187In line with the previous gift-exchange literature we observe a signiﬁcantly positive increase of effort with increasing wages in
both experiments (Experiment I: r¼0.20 with po0:01, Experiment II: r¼0.65 with po0:001).26 In the following we investigate if
there are additional inﬂuences on the employees' effort decision beyond the wage paid by the employee. Speciﬁcally, we want to
see whether those characteristics inﬂuencing the employers' decisions are predictive for employees' effort.
In both experiments employees come from provinces with varying average wages (in both experiments the lowest average
wage in the home province of an employee was 15,590 RMB and the highest was 27,820 RMB). On average, migrant workers
originated from provinces with signiﬁcantly lower wages (19,632 RMB) than student employees (24,281 RMB, po0:001, FPP).
However, while the employers' wage decisions are inﬂuenced by the average wages in the home provinces we do not observe any
signs for such an inﬂuence on employees' effort decisions (Experiment I: r¼0.4, p¼0.45; Experiment II: r¼0.08, p¼0.37).
Another variable that inﬂuences employers' wage decision is the ethnical heterogeneity of the home provinces. And in
both experiments employees are coming from provinces with diverse ethnical backgrounds, the lowest percentages of Non-
Han Chinese in home provinces are below 1% and the highest are 59%. Yet, no signiﬁcant correlation exists between the
percentage of Non-Han Chinese and exerted effort, neither in Experiment I (r¼ 3:6, p¼0.34) nor in Experiment II (r¼0.35,
p¼0.59). In addition, home provinces differ substantially with regard to the percentage of rural population, the lowest
percentage is 37% and highest 72.5%. While the ruralness of a province inﬂuenced the assigned wage it does not inﬂuence
the effort (Experiment I: r¼ 0:96, p¼0.68; Experiment II: r¼ 0:77, p¼0.17).
Potentially, average wages, as well as, ethnical and rural composition in the home provinces inﬂuence the effort only
conditional on the assigned wage. Therefore, we conduct as a last step of our analyses a series of logit regressions with
additional controls. Table 3 gives the estimates. Again no signiﬁcant inﬂuences of province characteristics are observed –
only assigned wages in the experiment increase the employees' effort.27
While the positive relationship between assigned wage and effort was expected and is in line with our hypothesis, the
missing connection between average wage levels in the home province and effort in the experiment is not in line with our
hypothesis. Thus, we can conﬁrm hypothesis 4, but have to reject hypothesis 5.
Result 5. The characteristics that inﬂuence employers' wage decisions do not predict effort. Only the wage assigned in the
experiment inﬂuences the effort decision.5. Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrated that an employees' origin can simultaneously trigger different motives for wage dis-
crimination. In our bilateral gift-exchange experiments employers conditioned wages on employees' home provinces.
Combining our experimental data with additional ﬁeld data on the characteristics of Chinese provinces we were able to
demonstrate that employers' discrimination was correlated with the actual wage level in the provinces, the ethnic com-
position in these provinces and whether the employee originated from the same home province. In addition, we observe
that wages decrease with increasing ruralness of provinces. However, these variables do not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the
employees' effort levels, only increasing assigned wages lead to higher effort.
The fact that the actual wage level in the employees' home provinces inﬂuenced the wage in our experiment is in line
with the fair-wage hypothesis (Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In addition, group-identity and in-group favoritism within natural
groups can explain the preferential treatment of employees with the same origin, as well as, lower wages to employees from
provinces with higher ethnic heterogeneity. Overall, our results are remarkably robust as they are based on data collected in
two different locations and hold for employers with higher socio-economic status than the employees (i.e., student
employers being matched with migrant workers) as well as for employers with similar socio-economic background as the
employees (i.e., student employers being matched with student employees).
We investigated the different motives for wage discrimination in an artefactual setting. Given the extensive debate on
the external validity of laboratory studies (e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007; Cohn et al., 2014; Camerer, 2015;
Herbst and Mas, 2015) the next step should be to replicate our results in a natural environment. If our results replicate in the
ﬁeld, they would be relevant for the discussion of anonymous job application procedures in which information on an
applicant's race or gender is removed from the resume to reduce discrimination in the hiring process (Hausman, 2012).
Previous ﬁndings demonstrate that anonymous applications have the potential to reduce discrimination (Åslund and Skans,
2012), but also potentially unindented effects (Krause et al., 2012; Behaghel et al., forthcoming). Our results suggest, that
already as little as an employee's origin might provide distinct motives for discrimination.(footnote continued)
identify these inﬂuences on the effort. The strategy method in the second experiment circumvents this potential criticism. Nevertheless, for completeness,
we report the results of our analysis for both experiments.
26 Logistic regression with clusters on the employee level in Experiment II.
27 In addition, we checked for Experiment II whether the wage decision made in the role of an employer inﬂuenced the effort decision in the role of an
employee. Neither the assigned wage to the home province, nor whether the subject choose discriminating wages inﬂuenced the effort decision sig-
niﬁcantly. Controlling for both does not change the reported non-results (see Table 15 in the Appendix).
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A.1. Recruitment of Subjects in Shanghai
Recruitment of student participants: At the Vernon-Smith-Lab of the Shanghai Jiao-Tong University (SJTU) all the subjects were
recruited through black boards. The announcement invited students to participate at a decision making experiment, in which they
could earn money, depending on their decision and the decisions of others. No further information, besides the date, time, place
and duration was given. The invitation text at the board was in Chinese and there was no connection to an institution (university,
research agency) outside SJTU. To sing-up, students had to send an email to the person responsible for the recruitment at SJTU. The
students could sign-up to participate in the experiment at the laboratory of the Xuhui Campus or Minhang Campus of SJTU. Thus
students had the opportunity to pick a location that was the closest to their dorm or classes.
Recruitment of the migrant workers: Eight student helpers (all Chinese) visited construction sites and cleaning agencies in
Shanghai to talk to the gangers of migrant workers. The assistants explained that we will do a decision-making experiment
and that we were looking for randomly recruited migrant workers. Details for the experiment were not revealed in the
explanation. However, the gangers were told that the participating workers would earn some money based on their
decisions and the decisions of other participants. Furthermore, the helpers asked for a heterogenous set of workers, coming
from different regions of the PR China, and without a permanent permission to stay in Shanghai. After the gangers
understood the purpose of our request they talked to the management of the construction sites for their permission and
arrange that workers could participate during their rest periods. Depending on the location of the construction site workers
were either sent to the laboratory of Xuhui Campus or Minhang Campus of SJTU.
A.2. Recruitment of subjects in Ningbo
Students were invited to participate in an online experiment via email. When students signed-up they received an 10
digit unique identiﬁcation number which they could later use to receive their payments from the experiment. When
subjects registered for the experiments they were asked for their home provinces. If a subject was from one of the excluded
municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) she was told that she could unfortunately not participate in the
experiment. To participate students needed a computer with an internet connection to open the website of the experiment.
The details of the experiment were explained on the screen and the instructions were based on the ones from Shanghai –
adjusted for the internet environment and for the pure student sample. After the experimental sessions, subjects came to
the assistant's ofﬁce and received their payments based on their unique identiﬁcation number.
A.3. Instructions (translated into English)
Welcome everyone, you are about to participate in an economic experiment. This experiment will last for about forty
minutes. If you read the Instructions carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money. It is
very important that you do not talk to other participants for the time of the entire experiment.
In the experiment, each student will be randomly matched with a migrant worker and the pair forms an employment
relationship. Students are the employers and workers the employees. Each student is endowed with 20 RMB as an initial
endowment. From this endowment, the students decide how much to pay the matched migrant worker as a wage. Students
can condition their wage on the origin of the migrant workers (the wage should be an integer no less than 11 RMB and no
more than 20 RMB). After receiving the wage, each worker decides to work hard or to work normal for the matched student.
It costs the worker 10 RMB to work hard but generates a proﬁt of 20 RMB for the student, while it costs the worker 5 RMB to
work normal generating a proﬁt of 5 RMB for the student.
Earnings student ¼ 20 RMBwage paid to workerþprofit from worker’s work
Earnings worker¼wage receivedcost of work
Example: If the student decides to give the worker 15 RMB as a wage, and the worker decides to work hard, the earnings are:
Earnings student¼ 20 RMB15 RMBþ20 RMB¼ 25 RMB
Earnings worker¼ 15 RMB10 RMB¼ 5 RMB
Sequence of the Experiment: (Students)
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side of your decision sheet.
2. Please state in your decision sheet the wages you would like to offer to workers from different provinces (the wage should
be an integer no less than 11 RMB and no more than 20 RMB). After that, please predict the effort for workers from each
province given the wage you offered.
3. After all decisions have been done our lab assistants will calculate the earnings of each participant and pay you in cash. In
the meantime please ﬁll-out the distributed questionnaire.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.
Sequence of the Experiment: (Migrant Workers)
1. Now that every participant has the instructions and a decision sheet, please put your code number on the upper-right
side of your decision sheet.
2. Please state your origin in the ﬁrst line of the decision sheet, and your expected wage from the matched student in the
second line.
3. On your decision sheet our lab assistants will write down the wage you received from the matched student. Please decide
if you would like to work normal or work hard for the student.
4. After all decisions have been done our lab assistants will calculate the earnings of each participant and pay in cash. In the
meantime please ﬁll-out the distributed questionnaire.
Please raise your hand if you have any further questions.Table 4
Decision sheet employer.
Province Wage to employee 11rWager20 You believe employee will work Your match (by assistants)
Sichuan ___________ Normal / Hard
Guizhou ___________ Normal / Hard
Guangdong ___________ Normal / Hard
Zhejiang ___________ Normal / Hard
Fujian ___________ Normal / Hard
Hunan ___________ Normal / Hard
Hubei ___________ Normal / Hard
Shandong ___________ Normal / Hard
Shanxi ___________ Normal / Hard
Henan ___________ Normal / Hard
Hebei ___________ Normal / Hard
Jilin ___________ Normal / Hard
Liaoning ___________ Normal / Hard
Heilongjiang ___________ Normal / Hard
Anhui ___________ Normal / Hard
Jiangsu ___________ Normal / Hard
Jiangxi ___________ Normal / Hard
Hainan ___________ Normal / Hard
Shaanxi ___________ Normal / Hard
Yunnan ___________ Normal / Hard
Qinghai ___________ Normal / Hard
Ningxia ___________ Normal / Hard
Gansu ___________ Normal / Hard
Xinjiang ___________ Normal / Hard
Tibet ___________ Normal / Hard
Guangxi ___________ Normal / Hard
Neimenggu ___________ Normal / Hard
Your matched employee decides to work: Normal / Hard (by assistants)
Your earning is: ___________RMB (by assistants)
Table 5
Decision sheet migrant worker.
Code:
You are from ___________________ Province
Your expected wage ___________ RMB ð11rWager20Þ
The matched student decides to pay you ___________ RMB (by assistants)
You decide to work Normal/hard
Your total earnings ___________ RMB (by assistants)
T. Chmura et al. / European Economic Review 90 (2016) 178–200190Appendix B. FiguresFig. 6. Assigned wages by employers who do not discriminate. Note: Roughly 43.9% of employers in Experiment I choose the same wages for all subjects,
2.4% did so in Experiment II.
Fig. 5. China and its provinces.
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See Tables 6–10.Table 6
Origin subject pool—percentages per province.
Experiment I Experiment II
Location: Shanghai Ningbo
Students Migrant workers Students
Subjects Subjects Population Subjects Population
Role: Employer Employee Employer/Employee
Anhui 0.07 0.10 0.291 0.018 0.032
Beijing 0.003 0.016
Chongqing 0.025 0.026
Fujian 0.06 0.00 0.030 0.018 0.025
Gansu 0.01 0.00 0.010 0.008 0.014
Guangdong 0.02 0.00 0.009 0.003 0.000
Guangxi 0.00 0.00 0.005 0.011 0.021
Guizhou 0.00 0.00 0.016 0.008 0.016
Hainan 0.01 0.00 0.001 0.000 0.017
Hebei 0.03 0.00 0.008 0.029 0.026
Heilongjiang 0.03 0.01 0.011 0.058 0.072
Henan 0.03 0.45 0.086 0.005 0.018
Hubei 0.07 0.01 0.045 0.016 0.021
Hunan 0.06 0.01 0.025 0.024 0.026
Jiangsu 0.15 0.14 0.169 0.024 0.017
Jiangxi 0.02 0.04 0.054 0.011 0.016
Jilin 0.00 0.01 0.007 0.000 0.017
Liaoning 0.01 0.00 0.007 0.029 0.029
Mongolia 0.01 0.00 0.003 0.011 0.018
Ningxia 0.02 0.00 0.001 0.000 0.013
Qinghai 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.003 0.001
Shaanxi 0.02 0.00 0.013 0.003 0.018
Shandong 0.12 0.02 0.042 0.029 0.033
Shanghai 0.12 0.023
Shanxi 0.01 0.00 0.005 0.013 0.017
Sichuan 0.00 0.05 0.068 0.037 0.028
Tianjin 0.01 0.001 0.039
Tibet 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000 0.000
Xinjiang 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.000 0.015
Yunnan 0.02 0.00 0.008 0.013 0.022
Zhejiang 0.07 0.14 0.052 0.632 0.363
Table gives the origins of our subjects and the population the employees were sampled from. The population of migrant workers is taken from the 2010
Chinese Population Census and gives the interprovincial ﬂoating population in Shanghai. 29.9% of the ﬂoating population in Shanghai comes from
Shanghai, the remaining 70.1% originate from the provinces given in the table. In 2015, 21.7% of the students at the University of Nottingham, Nigbo, were
international students, the remaining 78.3% originated from China. The table gives the origins of the Chinese student population.
Table 7
Correlation between province characteristics.
Average wage origin % NonHan origin % Rural origin GRP Unemployed
% NonHan Origin r¼0.4220
p¼0.0283
% Rural Origin r¼0.2147 r¼0.4435
p¼0.2821 p¼0.0205
GRP r¼0.2999 r¼0.5164 r¼0.5465
p¼0.1286 p¼0.0058 p¼0.0032
Unemployed r¼0.1286 r¼0.6615 r¼0.4045 r¼0.7288
p¼0.5226 p¼0.001 p¼0.0364 po0:001
Population r¼0.0278 r¼0.6015 r¼0.2062 r¼0.8581 r¼0.8499
p¼0.8906 po0:001 p¼0.3020 po0:001 po0:001
Table reports coefﬁcients and p-values for pairwise correlations between the variables from the complimentary ﬁeld data. Calculations based on the 27
provinces included in this study.
Table 8
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Students–migrant workers Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Wage Origin 0.400nnn 0.338nnn 0.175nn 1.635nnn 1.244nnn 0.665nnn
(0.0623) (0.0715) (0.0718) (0.273) (0.243) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.502nn 0.437nn 0.382n 1.373nnn 1.223nnn 1.266nnn
(0.211) (0.212) (0.211) (0.193) (0.161) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin 1.231nnn 1.050nnn 0.641nnn 3.749nnn 2.784nnn 1.416nnn
(0.121) (0.168) (0.187) (0.497) (0.509) (0.381)
% Rural Origin 0.498 0.0419 3.306nnn 3.383nnn
(0.353) (0.433) (1.033) (1.110)
Trust in Origin 0.0493nn 0.0476nn 0.101nnn 0.116nnn
(0.0206) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0193)
GRP/GDP 0.240nn 0.580
(0.0957) (0.390)
Central China 0.277nnn 0.175
(0.0669) (0.229)
South China 0.157nn 0.00481
(0.0733) (0.230)
Western China 0.268nnn 0.602nnn
(0.0890) (0.208)
Northeast China 0.0708 0.644nn
(0.0893) (0.258)
North China 0.265nnn 0.722nn
(0.0734) (0.278)
Constant 13.40nnn 13.49nnn 13.52nnn 11.65nnn 13.60nnn 14.62nnn
(0.114) (0.323) (0.351) (0.492) (0.915) (0.791)
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2646 2646 2646 10,260 10,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 98 380 380 380
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:0001 po0:0001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed
effects and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to.
nnn po0:01:
nn po0:05:
n po0:1:
Table 9
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment (1) (2) (3)
Average Wage Origin 0.400nnn 1.635nnn 1.635nnn
(0.0623) (0.273) (0.273)
Average Wage Origin  Migrantworker 1.235nnn
(0.267)
Same Origin 0.502nn 1.373nnn 1.373nnn
(0.211) (0.193) (0.193)
Same Origin  Migrantworker 0.871nn
(0.337)
% NonHan Origin 1.231nnn 3.749nnn 3.749nnn
(0.121) (0.497) (0.497)
% NonHan Origin  Migrantworker 2.518nnn
(0.453)
Constant 13.40nnn 11.65nnn 12.01nnn
(0.114) (0.492) (0.400)
Sample employee: Migrantworker Student Both
Observations 2646 10,260 12,906
Number of subjects 98 380 478
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed
effects and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Model 1 includes only wages assigned to migrant workers (Experiment I),
Model 2 only wages assigned to students (Experiment II), and Model 3 the data from both Experiments. Migrantworker is a dummy variable with a value of
one if the employer is matched with migrant workers.
nnnpo0:01.
nn po0:05:
n po0:1:
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Table 10
Classiﬁcation of individual's discrimination patterns.
Experiment I Experiment II
Numbers Share Numbers Share
A. Discriminating subjects
Subject discriminates at all 55/98 0.561 371/380 0.976
Subjects’ discrimination pattern not identiﬁed 4/55 0.073 24/371 0.065
Subjects’ discrimination pattern identiﬁed 51/55 0.927 347/371 0.935
B. Subjects inﬂuenced by Average Wage Origin, Same Origin or % NonHan Origin
Based on only one characteristics 18/55 0.353 94/347 0.271
a. Average Wage Origin 3 0.059 16 0.046
b. Same Origin 14 0.275 55 0.159
c. % NonHan Origin 1 0.020 23 0.066
Based on two characteristics 18/55 0.353 171/347 0.493
a. Average Wage Origin and % NonHan Origin 6 0.118 117 0.337
b. Average Wage Origin and Same Origin 3 0.059 12 0.035
c. % NonHan Origin and Same Origin 9 0.176 42 0.121
Based on all three characteristics 15/55 0.294 82/347 0.236
To classify the individual type of discrimination, we run for each employer a linear regression. Separately for each employer, we regress
wp ¼ y0þy1c1pþy2c2pþy3c3pþϵp with wp being the assigned wage to a province and c1p ; c2p and c3p being the characteristics Average Wage Origin, Same
Origin, and % NonHan Origin. If an estimated coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant on at least the 10% level we classify this employer as someone who discriminates based
on this motive.
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D.1. Additional controls: population and unemployment
In the regressions reported in the paper we do not control for population size and unemployment in the employees'
home provinces as they do not improve the ﬁt of the reported model. For completeness we report the estimations when
both are included as additional controls. Fig. 7 gives the distribution of the population sizes and unemployment numbers for
the 27 provinces and regions. Table 11 reports the resulting estimates when controlling for population and unemployment.
Neither are the coefﬁcients for population and unemployment signiﬁcant nor do they substantially improve the R2. In
Experiment I the R2 remains unchanged; in Experiment II it is improved by merely 0.06%. The coefﬁcients of our three main
explanatory variables remain relatively stable suggesting that our estimation does not suffer from omitted variable bias.
However, ruralness is highly correlated with the two variables and because of multicollinearity its effect turns insigniﬁcant.
D.2. Additional controls: differences in ruralness
The perceived ruralness of an employee's home province could potentially be inﬂuenced by the ruralness of the
employer's home province. In the following we run random-effects regressions with our full set of controls adding theFig. 7. Population and unemployment in the 27 provinces/regions
Table 11
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Students–migrant workers Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Wage Origin 0.175nn 0.181nn 0.665nnn 0.648nnn
(0.0718) (0.0662) (0.192) (0.218)
Same Origin 0.382n 0.383n 1.266nnn 1.270nnn
(0.211) (0.212) (0.146) (0.140)
% NonHan Origin 0.641nnn 0.621nn 1.416nnn 1.498nnn
(0.187) (0.256) (0.381) (0.424)
% Rural Origin 0.0419 0.0238 3.383nnn 2.932
(0.433) (0.849) (1.110) (2.080)
Trust in Origin 0.0476nn 0.0474nn 0.116nnn 0.115nnn
(0.0202) (0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0180)
Population 6.92e05 0.00297
(0.00453) (0.0137)
Unemployed 0.00172 5.68e–05
(0.00388) (0.0152)
Constant 13.52nnn 13.53nnn 14.62nnn 14.43nnn
(0.351) (0.520) (0.791) (1.271)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2646 2646 110,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 380 380
R2 overall 0.0097 0.0097 0.1558 0.1559
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:0001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed
effects and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional controls are the gross regional product relative to the gross
domestic product and region dummies (Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and Northeast China).
nnn po0:01:
nn po0:05:
n po0:1:
Table 12
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Students–migrant workers Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Average Wage Origin 0.175nn 0.175nn 0.664nnn 0.664nnn
(0.0719) (0.0719) (0.192) (0.192)
Same Origin 0.384n 0.384n 1.274nnn 1.274nnn
(0.219) (0.219) (0.145) (0.146)
% NonHan Origin 0.641nnn 0.641nnn 1.417nnn 1.417nnn
(0.187) (0.187) (0.382) (0.382)
% Rural Origin 0.0416 0.897 3.389nnn 3.501nn
(0.432) (1.635) (1.110) (1.476)
Difference Rural 0.855 0.112
(1.569) (0.957)
Constant 13.52nnn 13.11nnn 14.65nnn 14.71nnn
(0.425) (0.824) (0.846) (0.962)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2646 2646 110,260 10,260
Subjects 98 98 380 380
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:0001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with random effects
and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional controls are the gross regional product relative to the gross domestic
product and region dummies (Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and Northeast China).
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
n po0:1.
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ruralness does not inﬂuence the wage decision in our experiments.
D.3. Additional controls: socio-economic order
The positive inﬂuence on assigned wages could be caused by average wage levels being correlated with a possible
ranking of provinces along socio-economic status. We, therefore, test whether our results remain robust if we include
variables that could capture such a possible ranking. Table 13 gives the results of these additional robustness checks for
Experiment I and Experiment II. Models 1 and 6 repeat the last estimates from the main text with employer ﬁxed effects and
controls for trust towards province, percentage of the rural population, the gross regional products in relation to the gross
domestic product, and region dummies for Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and
Northeast China.
In Models 2 and 7, we add the ranking of provinces according to the average wage levels as a discrete variable (Ranking
Average Wages). To allow for nonlinearities, we add dummy variables for the quantiles of the wage ranking in Models 3 and
8. In Models 4 and 9, we use a ranking of provinces according to the gross regional product as a discrete variable (Ranking
GRP). And again, to allow for nonlinearities we include dummy variables for the quantiles of the gross regional product
ranking in Models 5 and 10.
While all these variables are correlated with the average wage levels in the provinces, they do not impact the originally
reported effect of Average Wage Origin on assigned wages in the experiments. The levels of signiﬁcance remain at con-
ventional levels and the coefﬁcients remain qualitatively similar. In fact, the largest changes are observed when controlling
for the ranking of wage levels, but the ranking actually increase the estimates for Average Wage Origin instead of reducing
them. This implies that the Average Wage Origin explains the assigned wages better than socio-economic rankings based on
wage levels or gross regional product.
D.4. Additional controls: strategy method
The exclusion of the municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) was based on the rationale that it would
be very unlikely for a migrant worker to move from Beijing to Shanghai. However, the number of employees coming from
the remaining provinces differs quite substantially between the provinces. Table 6 gives the distribution of home provinces
in our experiments for employers and employees. In Experiment I, most migrant workers originated from Henan (45%),Table 13
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Experiment I: Students–migrant workers Experiment II: Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Average Wage Origin 0.175nn 0.239nn 0.352nnn 0.180nn 0.145nn 0.665nnn 0.908nnn 0.894nnn 0.684nnn 0.585nnn
(0.0718) (0.0933) (0.103) (0.0668) (0.0679) (0.192) (0.288) (0.227) (0.185) (0.171)
Same Origin 0.383n 0.392n 0.388n 0.385n 0.384n 1.266nnn 1.225nnn 1.220nnn 1.224nnn 1.165nnn
(0.211) (0.211) (0.213) (0.211) (0.212) (0.146) (0.145) (0.155) (0.154) (0.165)
% NonHan Origin 0.641nnn 0.620nnn 0.689nnn -0.608nnn 0.531nnn 1.416nnn 1.348nnn 1.455nnn 1.358nnn 1.198nnn
(0.187) (0.177) (0.16) (0.186) (0.189) (0.381) (0.344) (0.327) (0.349) (0.384)
Ranking Average Wages 0.00478 0.017
(0.00497) (0.0161)
Ranking GRP 0.00779 0.0151
(0.00641) (0.0214)
Constant 13.52nnn 13.50nnn 13.43nnn 13.49nnn 13.66nnn 14.62nnn 14.54nnn 14.53nnn 14.55nnn 15.18nnn
(0.351 (0.341) (0.32) (0.338) (0.406) (0.791) (0.783) (0.706) (0.764) (0.866)
Average Wage Quantile No No Yes No No No No Yes No No
GRP Quantile No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2646 2646 2646 2646 2646 10,260 10,260 10,260 10,260 10,260
Number of UID 98 98 98 98 98 380 380 380 380 380
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001
Table reports regressions of wage decisions by employers on employees' province characteristics. All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed
effects and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional controls are trust towards province, ruralness of province, the
gross regional product relative to the gross domestic product and region dummies (Central China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and
Northeast China).
nnn po0:01:
nn po0:05:
n po0:1.
Table 14
Explaining the wage in the experiment.
Wage in experiment Experiment I: Students–migrant workers Experiment II: Students–students
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Wage Origin 0.175nn 0.333nnn 0.203nn 0.188nn 0.665nnn 0.882n 0.579nnn 0.598nnn
(0.0718) (0.0954) (0.0805) (0.0730) (0.192) (0.450) (0.202) (0.199)
Same Origin 0.382n 0.359 0.382n 0.387n 1.266nnn 1.166nnn 1.100nnn 1.112nnn
(0.211) (0.217) (0.212) (0.212) (0.146) (0.149) (0.123) (0.128)
% NonHan Origin 0.641nnn 0.559nnn 0.691nnn 0.685nnn 1.416nnn 1.343n 1.306nnn 1.319nnn
(0.187) (0.111) (0.207) (0.208) (0.381) (0.755) (0.385) (0.387)
% in Sample 0.368n 0.594
(0.185) (0.457)
% in Population 0.468 0.958
(0.337) (0.772)
Constant 13.52nnn 13.13nnn 13.38nnn 13.47nnn 14.62nnn 14.05nnn 14.67nnn 14.63nnn
(0.351) (0.530) (0.381) (0.361) (0.791) (1.705) (0.767) (0.783)
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Employer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Full Origin in sample Full Full Full Origin in sample Full Full
Observations 2646 1176 2646 2646 10,260 8360 10,260 10,260
Number of UID 98 98 98 98 380 380 380 380
Prob4F po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001 po0:001
All columns give panel regressions with employer ﬁxed effects and robust clusters on the level of the province the wage was assigned to. Additional
controls are trust towards province, ruralness of province, the gross regional product relative to the gross domestic product and region dummies (Central
China, East China, South China, Western China, North China, and Northeast China).
nnn po0:01:
nn po0:05:
n po0:1:
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Sichuan (3.7%). In both experiments, there were provinces from which no subject originated (e.g., Tibet in both experi-
ments). Thus, some wage decisions were more likely to be realized for the payments than others. This naturally raises the
question if all responses were equally well incentivized and all decisions made with the same seriousness. In Table 14 we
present additional robustness checks. Models 1 and 5 present the results from the main paper with employer ﬁxed effects
and the full set of controls for trust towards province, percentage of the rural population, the gross regional products in
relation to the gross domestic product, and region dummies. In Models 2 and 6, we apply the most rigorous robustness
check by dropping all provinces from which no employee originated in the corresponding experiment. This reduces the
sample in Experiment I by more than 50%. The p-value for Same Origin drops to p¼0.127 while the p-values for Average
Wage Origin and % NonHan Origin remain on conventional levels of signiﬁcance. In Experiment II this reduces the sample by
18.5% but the p-values for our main coefﬁcients Average Wage Origin, Same Origin, and % NonHan Origin remain on con-
ventional levels. In Models 3, 4, 7, and 8 we keep the whole sample, but include either the variable % In Sample or % In
Population to control for the likelihood of being matched with someone from a province. % In Sample bases the probability on
the distribution in the sample while % In Population bases the probability on the populations from which the samples were
drawn (see Table 6). Results are qualitatively in line with our originally reported results and all effects are on the same levels
of signiﬁcance as in Models 1 and 5. Therefore, we conclude that our main effects are qualitatively not inﬂuenced by the
actual distribution of employee's home provinces in our sample.D.5. Additional controls: inﬂuences on second stage behavior
In Experiment II subjects ﬁrst decided in the role of employers and then decided in the role of employees. While they did
not receive feedback after the ﬁrst stage it is still possible that the ﬁrst stage behavior inﬂuenced the second stage behavior.
In Table 15 we add controls for their ﬁrst stage decisions. The variable Employer: Wage assigned is the wage the subject
assigned to employees from the same province in the ﬁrst stage. Employer: Discriminated is a dummy variable which values
turns one if the subject discriminated as an employer. Neither do these two variables inﬂuence the decision to exert high
effort, nor does the inclusion change any of the previously reported non-results.
Table 15
Explaining the effort in Experiment II.
Prob(High Effort) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Wage in experiment 1.0343nnn 1.0343nnn 1.0343nnn 1.0343nnn
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Worker's origin real wage 0.1559 0.1283 0.1563 0.1282
(0.413) (0.417) (0.413) (0.417)
Worker's origin % NonHan 2.9427 2.8764 2.9461 2.8811
(2.082) (2.087) (2.083) (2.087)
Worker's origin % Rural 4.0650 4.1274 4.0809 4.1616
(2.582) (2.585) (2.596) (2.601)
Worker female 0.2532 0.2649 0.2525 0.2638
(0.289) (0.290) (0.289) (0.290)
Worker's age 0.0038 0.0036 0.0037 0.0035
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Employer: Wage assigned 0.0226 0.0234
(0.048) (0.048)
Employer: Discriminated 0.1023 0.2075
(1.721) (1.735)
Constant 14.5151nnn 14.1575nnn 14.5075nnn 14.1305nnn
(2.178) (2.304) (2.182) (2.315)
Observations 3800 3800 3800 3800
Number of UID 380 380 380 380
Prob4χ2 0 0 0 0
Random-effects logistic regression explaining effort decision in Experiment II.
nnn po0.01.
nn po0.05.
n po0:1.
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Here we introduce a formal model describing the employees' (E) and the employers' (R) decision. The model is designed
to resemble as closely as possible the environment for the participants of the experiment.
E.1. Decision structure, timing, and beliefs
The timing of the moves mirrors the experiment described in Section 2 of the paper and Appendix A. Upon meeting,
employee i reveals his origin, i.e., in which province P employee i was born. This is the only piece of information that is
exchanged. After learning the employee's origin piAP, the employer forms beliefs Fj about the lowest wagewFi ðai; piÞ that the
employee regards as a fair compensation for working hard, where ai denotes additional, exogenous information such as the
average wage in a certain province or the share of Non-Han Chinese living in the province. On the basis of these beliefs, the
employer will offer employee i a wage wj. The wage wj can take values on the interval ½wmin;wmax ¼ ½11;20 in our
experiment. After the employer made the wage offer, the employee decides on whether to work hard ðei ¼ 1Þ or normal
ðei ¼ 0Þ.
We follow Akerlof (1982) in assuming that employees compare wage offers wj to what they regard as a fair compensation
for a high effort. Naturally, the notion of a fair compensation e.g. depends on previously received wages, unemployment
beneﬁts, work norms and wages paid to reference groups. While most of Akerlof's determinants of a fair wage are irrelevant
in our setting, wages paid to a reference group are highly relevant and are derived from the average wage levels in the home
province pi of worker i. After all, a migrant worker would only move to a different province if s/he expects to earn more than
in her home province. The precise functional relationship between the actual wage level in the home province and the wage
level wi
F
worker i regards as a fair compensation is unknown and may differ between individuals from the same province.
However, it is reasonable to assume that wi
F
increases with the average wage level in province pi.
Employers are aware that employees are only willing to exert a high work effort if the employer offers a wage higher
than the employee's notion of a fair wage wFi ðÞ. However, the only piece of information exchanged prior to the wage offer is
the home province of the employee i. Therefore, employers form their beliefs Fj about employee i's notion of a fair wage on
the information of the home province pi and the associated publicly available information about this home province, such as
the average wage, the share of Non-Han Chinese or the unemployment rate. Assume that employee i is prepared to work
hard for wages wjZwFi ðÞ. Then, F
pi
j ðwj; Þ denotes the probability that the wage offer wj indeed exceeds i's notion of a fair
wage wFi ðÞ. We impose only one restriction upon the employers' beliefs, the beliefs F
pi
j ðwj; Þ are strictly unimodal with an
expected value μpij ¼ μjðaðpiÞÞ and variance σ
pi
j . Hence, employer j forms beliefs about the expected value of employee i's fair
wage on the basis of publicly available information about the province pi. Consequently, expected fair wage levels μ
pi
j will
differ depending on the migrant workers' home province. We allow each employer j to form his/her own beliefs upon the
expected fair wage μpij as well as the accuracy of their beliefs, σ
pi
j , i.e., two employers may well disagree about μ
pi
j and σ
pi
i .
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Given the decision structure, information and timing as described above, it is clear that the notion about what constitutes
a fair wage is unique to each individual employee. Of course we assume that certain patterns can be observed as, e.g., a
positive correlation between the average wage in a province and the fair wage. However two employees from the same
province do not necessarily have the same fair wage.
The basis of any gift exchange as described above is that the recipient of the initial gift derives a positive utility from
reciprocal behavior. We therefore follow Falk and Fischbacher (2006) in modifying the employees' objective function to
allow for reciprocal behavior. Let employee i's objective function be given by
UEi ðei;wj;wFi ðÞÞ ¼ πEi þρi wjwFi ðÞ
 
πRj ;
where πi
E
and πj
R
are the payoffs for employee i and employer j respectively. ρi is a positive constant which measures the
strength of i's reciprocal feelings, i.e., the second expression on the right hand side of the objective function. The reciprocal
component itself is comprised of what Falk and Fischbacher (2006) call the kindness term, here wjwFi ðÞ, and the reci-
procation term, here πj
R
.
After the employer made a speciﬁc wage offer wj, the employee decides on the effort s/he wants to exert. Given the
employee's utility function, the employee will work hard only if
ΔUEi ≔UEi ei ¼ 1;wj;wFi ðÞ
 UEi ei ¼ 0;wj;wFi ðÞ Z0;
otherwise employees will work with normal work effort. Let yH ¼ yðei ¼ 1ÞðyL ¼ yðei ¼ 0ÞÞ denote an employee's productivity
when s/he exerts the high (normal) work effort. Then, the payoffs for the employees and employers simpliﬁes to
πEi ¼wjcðeiÞ and πRj ¼ yðeiÞwj respectively (see also above) so that ΔUEi can be determined with
ΔUEi ¼ Δcþρi wjwFi ðÞ
 
yHyL ;
whereΔc¼ cðei ¼ 1Þcðei ¼ 0Þ40 is the difference in disutility that a high effort requires compared to a normal effort. Since
yHyL as well as Δc is positive, employees will work hard if
wjZ
Δc
ρiðyHyLÞ
þwFi ai; pi
 
≕wHi ai; pi
 
Therefore, an employee will only consider to work hard if the wage offer is sufﬁciently higher than the fair wage wFi ðÞ.
wi
F
and therefore wi
H
are unknown to the employer. However, employers form beliefs about wi
F
and therefore wi
H
and are
perfectly aware that the above inequality is more easily satisﬁed when the wage offer wj is higher. This result mirrors our
Hypothesis 4 above. It is also obvious that higher levels of a fair compensation wi
F
induce a lower work effort for every given
wage offer wj. This is expressed in our Hypothesis 5 above (see also Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).
To summarize, the optimal work effort is
ei ¼
1 if wjZwHi ;
0 if wjowHi :
(
E.3. Employers' decision
Employers are aware of the employees inclination to only work hard if the wage offer exceeds the employee's notion of a
fair wage. However, employers have no way of ascertaining the level wi
F
for an employee. Hence, the employer has to form
beliefs about the employee's fair wage wi
F
and wi
H
on the basis of the employee's home province pi. Unless the employer
offers the maximum wage wmax, there will always be a positive probability that the wage offer will be lower than the fair
wage wi
H
and that the employee exerts only the normal work effort. Consequently, employee i's productivity is uncertain as
long as wjowmax. Let yH and yL be deﬁned as above. Then, the expected proﬁts for employer j can be written as
EπRj ¼ Fpij ðwj; aiÞðyHwjÞþ 1F
pi
j ðwj; aiÞ
 
ðyLwjÞ:
Since Fpij ðwj; aiÞ denotes the probability that the fair wage wFi rwj, employee i will exert the high work effort and display the
high productivity yH. With the residual probability 1Fpij ðwj; aiÞ employee i's fair wage is higher than the wage offer wj so
that employee i will display the low productivity yL.
Similar to employees, employers base their decision on the wage offer not exclusively on the expected proﬁt. Employers
might derive positive utility from being sympathetic to employees from the same province. Let 1pj ðpiÞ denote the indicator
function
1pj ðpiÞ ¼
1 if pj ¼ piAP;
0 if pjapiAP;
(
i.e., the function takes the value one if the employee and the employer are from the same province and zero otherwise.
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URj ¼ EπRj þαj1pj ðpiÞwj ¼ F
pi
j ðwj; ÞðyHwjÞþ 1F
pi
j ðwj; Þ
 
ðyLwjÞþαj1pj ðpiÞwj
where αj1pj ðpiÞwj is the utility that employer j derives from paying an employee from the same home province as himself a
higher wage.
An employer chooses wj so that his/her utility is maximized. The ﬁrst and second order conditions are given by
∂URj
∂wj
¼ Fpijwj wj; 
 
yHyL 1þαj1pj pi r0;
∂2URj
∂w2j
¼ Fpijwjwj wj; 
 
yHyL r0:
Since yHyL is always positive, the second-order condition is only satisﬁed, if Fpijwjwj ðwj; Þr0, i.e., if the employer offers a
wage wj that is larger than his/her expectation of the fair wage μ
pi
j for employee from province pi. According to the ﬁrst-
order condition, the optimal wage offer wj has to satisfy
f pij wj; 
 ¼ 1αj1pj ðpiÞ
yHyL ð1Þ
where f pij ðwj; Þ is the density function associated with the belief function F
pi
j ðwj; Þ.
E.3.1. The optimal wage offer
As previously discussed, the employer has to form beliefs about an employee's notion of a fair wage compensation on the
basis of the only piece of information s/he has – the home province pi. We assumed that the belief functions F
pi
j ðwj; Þ are
strictly unimodal with an expected value of μpij . Naturally, publicly available information about the provinces will inﬂuence
the belief structure fFsj gsAP . It is reasonable to assume that the expected value μ
pi
j equals the average wage in the province pi.
Then, it follows directly from the second-order condition above that the offered wage wj will be higher when the average
wage μpij increases, which is summarized in Hypothesis 1 above.
Since f pijwj
o0 to satisfy the second-order condition, employers are prepared to pay higher wages to employees from their
own home province according to Eq. (1). The stronger the attachment to their own province, i.e., the larger αj, the higher will
be the wage offered to an employee from an employer's own home province. This is summarized in Hypothesis 2 above.
Finally, in Hypothesis 3 we state our belief that wage offers will decline as the shares of Non-Han Chinese in the
employees' home province are increasing. Let ai stand for the share of Non-Han Chinese in i's home province pi. From Eq. (1)
follows immediately that the optimal wage offer changes with an increasing share of Non-Han Chinese according to
dwj
dai
¼ 
∂f pij ðwj; aiÞ=∂ai
∂f pij ðwj; aiÞ=∂wj
o0:
The wage offer will decrease with an increasing share of Non-Han Chinese in the province if ∂f pij =∂aio0. If the average wage
is on average lower in provinces with a higher share on Non-Han Chinese which we indeed observe, then this condition will
be satisﬁed.Appendix F. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this paper can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.04.005.References
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